Economist Bill Rosenberg Submission on the Regulatory Standards Bill 2025

Former Productivity Commissioner exposes how the Regulatory Standards Bill threatens democracy, entrenches inequality, and empowers unchecked ministerial control.

A guest post sharing Bill Rosenberg's submission on the RSB

Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee

on the

Proposed Regulatory Standards Bill

Dr Bill Rosenberg

Summary

The principles of the bill are overly simplistic and biased towards a particular ideological view, one that has led to multiple costly regulatory failures. In practice, governments have a much broader view of the purposes of regulation than the principles.

Regulatory quality is important but requires consensus between political parties and adequate resourcing to be effective. Without cross-party support, principles of regulatory practice will not survive changes of government, and the history of the proposed bill shows support for this proposal is unlikely. The Regulatory Impact Statement also shows lack of support among officials across multiple government agencies including those agencies most involved in implementing the legislation.

What is proposed is a heavy-handed system that will hamper adaptable regulation.

The Minister’s claim which is presented as his primary rationale for this proposal, that “Most of New Zealand's problems can be traced to poor productivity, and poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations” is shown to be incorrect. New Zealand has many problems that are not economic, and there are many factors other than regulation that affect productivity.

The submission comments on specific aspects of the proposed bill. Wording is poorly defined and expressed and would increase uncertainty. The principles – particularly those relating to the “taking” of property – could lead to government paralysis, prevent needed change, create huge costs to the government, and lock in existing inequities, inequality, discrimination and poor environmental practice. They disregard collective interests and values and rule out many sensible policies which would be in the public interest. The Regulatory Standards Board appears to escape the controls of the Crown Entities Act and it is controlled by the Minister.

The proposed powers of the Minister would be dangerous and with little accountability outside Cabinet and caucus.

I recommend that

R1. This bill should not proceed.

R2. Consideration should instead be given to simplification of regulatory quality processes and their more effective implementation within the agencies responsible for regulation; ensuring the definition of quality covers the ability (including sufficient skills and resources) of relevant agencies to implement and enforce the regulation effectively; reducing the instances of duplication or overlap of these responsibilities; maintaining cross-party agreement; resourcing the agencies better for their regulatory quality responsibilities; and safeguarding the expertise residing in their staff.

Introduction

1. I wish to speak to this submission.

2. I have a BSc. Hons in Mathematics, a B. Com in Economics and a PhD in Psychology. I have worked as a bus driver, an information technology professional and manager, as an economist, as a Commissioner in the Tertiary Education Commission Te Amorangi Mātauranga Matua, and the Productivity Commission Te Kōmihana Whai Hua o Aotearoa, and am currently a Visiting Scholar at Victoria University of Wellington Te Herenga Waka. I was a member of the government’s Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety 2012-13 which reviewed the health and safety system after the Pike River disaster, and have had considerable practical involvement in health and safety regulation and policy. I was also a member of the 2018-19 Tax Working Group, and have served on a number of Statistics New Zealand advisory committees. My research and publications cover subjects including labour economics and industrial relations, productivity, economic rents, income distribution, social support, health funding, health and safety, foreign investment, international trade agreements, and news media ownership.

3. It is a pity that the important topic of regulatory quality has been poisoned by the ideological approach taken by the ACT Party to enact the Regulatory Standards Bill (“the bill”), with the support of other Government political parties. It is ideological in that the bill has been rejected by Parliament on good grounds three times now (in only marginally different forms), and yet the ACT Party continues to pursue principles which embed that Party’s values, which I will show are extreme, rather than take a sound and realistic approach that will attract ongoing multi-party and public support.

4. Even if the Government persists and forces this bill through Parliament in some form it will not survive – and certainly should not survive – changes in Government. It will only reinforce the wide-spread view that “regulatory standards” is a euphemism for damaging deregulation which ACT and some other members of this Government have long advocated (a recent example is Seymour, 2024). People’s memories will not fade of leaky buildings, the crash of poorly regulated finance companies and the death toll resulting from weak health and safety laws, to name only a few disastrous and costly regulatory failures which were the result of “light-handed” regulation and weak enforcement.

5. The public confidence that this bill has been put forward in good faith is further weakened by the process surrounding the Government’s own policy programme which breaks most of the principles that the bill claims are sound. It has enacted a large programme without Regulatory Impact Analyses, or with only inadequate ones (often produced in a limited form due to the dedication of public servants with limited time and shrinking resources). This is acknowledged by the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) for this bill which replaces the
inadequate “interim” RIS that was all that officials were able to produce for the Ministry of Regulation’s earlier consultation. The Government has ignored expert advice and/or sound process in multiple policy areas including transport, road safety, tobacco control, climate change, social welfare, boot camps, and te Tiriti o Waitangi, to mention only some. The Fast Track legislation breaks good legislative practice in its own right and invites future breaches of good regulatory principles including adequate consultation and sufficient time for good decision making. The centralised Ministry for Regulation and associated Ministerial position were created without any rigorous consideration of alternatives or public consultation.

6. The proposed bill is itself an example of poor practice by its own standards. Its own RIS points out that a non-legislative solution would be preferable. The quality assurance panel which reviewed the RIS agrees. Despite consultation which was overwhelmingly against the bill, the government is proceeding with it as a predetermined outcome. The fact that the bill has been through the legislative process unsuccessfully three times is further evidence that it is poor legislation. A government acting in good faith would try another, more effective approach that might have some chance of enduring. Asking the public to waste its time going through this process yet again is not in good faith and is insulting. It is a cynical exercise of power with an outcome already announced in the National-ACT coalition agreement. A quite different process is needed if the Government genuinely desires a sustainable approach to quality regulation.

The objectives of regulation are broad and varied

7. My main point is this. The key criteria for the quality of regulation are that it should be effective in meeting its objectives and – omitted from any discussion in the papers provided – that the means to implement and enforce the regulation effectively are in place. The latter has historically been a key failing, well documented in the cases of leaky buildings and health and safety (see for example Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, 2013; Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012).

8. The objectives of regulation are many and varied and will differ with the government in power. They inescapably involve a balance between fiscal, economic, social, environmental and other objectives, and between individual and collective interests. No small, predetermined set of objectives or “principles” can be forced to dominate as the bill attempts to do, privileging considerations of cost and property ownership – albeit poorly defined – and individual preferences (“liberties”) above others. A small, predetermined set of objectives cannot dominate because the real world and what people value are complex. Striking the balance between objectives is intrinsically and unavoidably a political process.

9. To try to force ideologically selected principles onto such a process undermines democracy itself. It locks society into a status quo which in reality many people want to change because it is far from ideal, and they will assuredly want to change it in future. The intention of the sponsors and the nature of the principles goes further than that, encouraging reversal of policies with widespread support, such as for minimum wages, health and safety, and against discrimination, as will be seen below. Indeed, change is being forced on society by forces such as climate change, technological change, changing international relationships and wars, threats to public health such as pandemics, and demographics. The principles limit our ability to make these changes in a socially optimal way. They privilege the status quo distribution of income, wealth, power and access to resources, and tolerance of environmental and social damage.

10. They will therefore be inherently damaging to social cohesion, social progress, economic progress and the sustainability and improvement of the environment.

11. There may however be some common and non-contentious ground in terms of process as distinct from objectives of the regulation: how regulation is developed, monitored, evaluated and reviewed. A sound approach to the process of achieving regulatory quality must be based on encouragement to those involved, both within and outside government, to carefully clarify their objectives, consider the evidence that will help address the objectives, identify and weigh the options to address the objectives (including, but not limited to cost benefit analysis – see for example Pells (2023)). Encouragement includes ensuring public service staff have the relevant subject expertise, training in analysis methodologies, and sufficient time and resources. Regular raids on “back room staff” who carry out these analyses is not encouragement.

12. As the RIS states, much of the pressure for skimping on good analysis comes from the political level as we see across governments of all stripes. The approach must take that into account. It should try to gain cross-party consensus as far as possible.

13. Yet the bill mixes a sprinkling of both procedural and substantive “standards”, neither of which are complete and most of which are contentious.

14. Before making specific comments on the proposed bill, I make two other points.

Heavy handed

15. The approach being suggested, and to a lesser extent the Ministry for Regulation’s preferred approach (RIS Option Three), risk making the regulatory process so laden with procedural requirements, impact reports, second and third opinions, audits, assurance, vetting, reviews, appeals and monitoring (as illustrated by the diagram on p.15 of the discussion paper) that it becomes a barrier to the essential adaption of regulation to developing needs. It is a recipe for institutional sclerosis. The suggestion that there will need to be exemptions reinforces this concern.

16. It risks the development of needed regulation being avoided by agencies because of the cost of the process. It is setting up regulation of the regulatory process which breaks its own principles of minimising costs. There is only partial assessment in the RIS of the ongoing costs of the proposal, and even those that can be evaluated the RIS states risk being low quality or may reduce the capacity of agencies to do their substantive work unless additional resources are provided (p.43). In particular, it does not include any estimate for “resourcing or time required during the development of policy and corresponding legislation as a result of following the proposed principles” (p.39). There will be high costs resulting from compensation for broadly defined regulatory takings and from the legal cases that are likely to result from the bill’s principles being embedded in future legislation, and possibly from legal actions resulting from this bill itself. The alternative, which may be a desired outcome in the minds of the sponsors of the bill, is damaging regulatory paralysis in preference to allowing such challenges to occur. I discuss regulatory takings further below.

17. I have observed an agency (WorkSafe) regularly using less formal instruments in order to avoid the already heavy procedural needs of regulations. This has reduced the effectiveness of both the agency and the instruments, and reduced clarity for those affected.

18. There does not appear to have been any analysis for this proposal of the behavioural impacts of mounting layer upon layer of process and content requirements. The proposed bill would only make the situation worse. Avoidance will not lead to improved quality.

19. This is regulatory overload in the process of regulation.

The relationship to productivity

20. The Minister in his foreword to the Ministry of Regulation discussion paper (p.3) makes the sweeping statement that “Most of New Zealand's problems can be traced to poor productivity, and poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations”. Similarly, since then he has regularly stated in media statements (e.g. 7 May 2025, 19 May 2025, 23 May 2025) “New Zealand's low wages can be blamed on low productivity, and low productivity can be blamed on poor regulation.” The relationship between regulation and productivity appears to be central to justifying the proposal’s heavy overheads and focus on cost and so is worth analysing. The following summarises a longer analysis in the Appendix to this submission.

21. I note that a quite different rationale was given in the Cabinet paper released with the Ministry consultation – the assertion made without evidence that “In [the Minister’s] view, government regulation imposes costs just as great, if not greater, on people’s everyday lives as government taxing and spending”. And in the Parliamentary debate for the bill’s first reading under urgency, the word “productivity” was mentioned only once, and in a different context (that “the cost of living crisis is really a productivity crisis”).

22. To be clear: I am not asserting that good quality regulation is irrelevant to productivity. It certainly is relevant in many cases – often ones specific to a particular industry or project – and it is also necessary to ensure that the benefits of productivity growth are widely spread (such as into wages). But I am arguing that any assertion that our productivity problems can be solved by fixing our regulations is greatly exaggerated and does not justify the radical constraints on regulation-making in this proposal. As most experts would advise, there is no single solution to our productivity problems, and there is no instant fix – it is a long game.

23. I deal with the first parts of the Minister’s assertions, that “Most of New Zealand's problems can be traced to poor productivity” and that “New Zealand's low wages can be blamed on low productivity” in the Appendix and show that they are not correct.

24. The second part of the Minister’s statements is a rationale for the heavy apparatus he is proposing to set up: “poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations.” He presumably is suggesting that poor regulations are the sole or principal driver of poor productivity. Officials do not appear to be as convinced, referring to it as “important” in some places and “crucial” in others in the discussion paper and interim RIS for the Ministry consultation, and saying only that it “can” support innovation (which can be a means to raising productivity) among a long list of other possibilities in the latest RIS for the bill (p.13). But the Minister’s suggestion is not true.

25. Consider the well-known “New Zealand productivity paradox” that first puzzled the OECD in 2003:

The mystery is why a country that seems close to best practice in most of the policies that are regarded as the key drivers of growth is nevertheless just an average performer. (OECD, 2004, p. 29)

26. They were referring to policies in areas such as taxation, product and labour market regulation, innovation and education. That is, regulation.

27. Clearly the supposedly exemplary regulatory environment was not fixing the productivity problem. The causes lay elsewhere than in the quality of regulation.

28. In addition, international comparisons are treacherous. The success of policy is heavily country- and context-specific, rather than being fit for the purpose of broad inter-country comparisons. As Skilling (2020, p. 2) and the Productivity Commission (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2021, pp. 13, 24) have stated, “small advanced economies are not just scaled-down versions of large economies but have distinctive characteristics in their economic behaviour” and that “New Zealand is not a ‘standard OECD country’ and faces an unusual set of challenges and opportunities”.

29. In the Appendix I compare Aotearoa New Zealand’s labour productivity levels, average annual productivity increases over the previous 10 years, and rankings of regulatory quality with a set of successful small advanced OECD countries.

30. The standout from the comparison is that while Aotearoa New Zealand’s labour productivity level and productivity growth are low, those with much better productivity performance (most of the countries listed) mostly have lower or markedly lower rankings than Aotearoa New Zealand on most of the regulation indicators.

31. It is inescapable from this evidence that regulatory quality issues are not overwhelming determinants of productivity performance. The context is all-important. Other aspects of a country’s policies, institutions, economic structure, trade performance, geography, history, culture, education, management skills, labour relations, demography, social cohesion and endowments (among other factors) are likely to be just as important, or more important.

32. Of course, arguments can be made about the details and definitions of these indicators.[1] But it is this evidence that is relied on to call for heavy-handed deregulatory measures. It is the only hard evidence mentioned in the discussion paper and interim RIS, and the evidence does not support the proposal. There is no other evidence presented (other than generalities and assertions) that Aotearoa New Zealand has remarkedly excessive or low quality regulation, either on an absolute basis or relative to other countries.

33. Indeed the RIS (p. 13-14) makes some similar points to the above, notes that international measures do not consider levels of compliance and how well they work in practice, and observes that “New Zealand regulation rates reasonably well in international comparison” quoting evidence, and that “Ironically, more regulation in areas such as digital markets and political lobbying would much improve our Product Market Regulation ranking”.

34. Instead an evidence-based approach to improving productivity involves diagnosing the real problems we face and designing solutions which address them. This may include regulations which are productivity-enhancing but would cause the OECD to downgrade the country’s ranking, and may well breach the proposed regulatory principles, such as –

· Kiwibank being given a public service obligation requiring it to compete strongly with the big four banks in exchange for government support to expand its services.

· Government procurement practices which encourage local industry development in areas of priority such as reducing carbon emissions or increasing skills, or assist firms develop markets and scale for new products, or assist the development of regional or Māori firms. Such measures are used internationally and have been suggested in the Productivity Commission report New Zealand firms: reaching for the frontier (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2021) and by the Digital Technologies industry in its Industry Transformation Plan (Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment, 2023). Variations of such measures appear to have support from both the current and previous governments.

· A more selective process for Foreign Direct Investment, as is being increasingly used internationally. The quality of Foreign Direct Investment in Aotearoa New Zealand has been low – it tends to be concentrated in non-tradeable sectors and in areas which provide market dominance, there are few spillovers in productivity or workers’ skills, or it perpetuates reliance on existing products such as log exports or lightly processed dairy products (Joyce, 2015, para. 23; Rosenberg, 2015). A “frontier firms” strategy to raise productivity, as recommended in the above Productivity Commission report, where development in a particular area is led by a large productivity-frontier firm, depends on selecting a few large firms with the required record and characteristics.

35. Stronger regulation can be productivity-enhancing. More stringent competition rules can enforce more competitive markets or force dominant firms to purchase and supply at competitive rates. Environmental regulation can force producers to find more efficient production methods or to make their products work more efficiently. Labour regulation to raise wages and working conditions can incentivise producers to increase their use of capital and thus increase productivity.

Specific comments on the proposed bill

36. I comment here on selected aspects of the proposal. My lack of comment on other aspects does not imply approval.

37. Some of the bill’s advocates argue that because the bill only requires a Minister to explain why regulation is in conflict with the principles, the concerns about the principles do not matter. Yet if it is true, why legislate? Is the legislation merely performative?

38. The intention is that these principles become part of the interpretation of regulation and constrain the ability and will of governments to make progressive change, or steer it in the direction of legislating the principles explicitly. The intention is that its principles become part of other laws, and increasingly so. Its dangers are therefore real.

Principles of responsible regulation (s8)

39. As already stated, the bill mixes a sprinkling of procedural and substantive “standards”, neither of which are complete and most of which are contentious. To be clear, I oppose the adoption of these principles.

Lack of inclusion of Te Tiriti o Waitangi

40. This is a significant omission whose results cannot be predicted. As it stands, this aspect of the bill is a further step in attempting to weaken the significance of Te Tiriti, accompanying the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Bill in doing so. It underlines the selectivity of the bill towards ACT ideological priorities.

Rule of law

41. That the law should be clear and accessible (s8(a)(i)) should be uncontroversial but conflicts with this government’s repeal of the Plain Language Act which was particularly supported by people with disabilities who valued its contribution to accessibility.

42. It is extraordinary that s8(a)(ii) only disallows retrospective law if it “adversely affect[s] rights and liberties, or impose[s] obligations”. “Rights” and “liberties” are undefined. Retrospective law is apparently fine if for example it legalises destruction of the environment, construction of unsafe buildings or the sale of unsafe products that have occurred in the past. This principle conflicts with the action of the government to retrospectively cancel the right of women to take and continue pay equity claims.

43. S8(a)(iii) stating that “Every person is equal before the law” is simplistic, will create uncertainty and will need extensive interpretation. As the Human Rights Commission states about the principle in its explanation of human rights in Aotearoa:

Equality and fairness are not just about having laws and processes that appear to treat everyone equally or in the same way (sometimes called ‘formal equality’). Equality and fairness are also about what happens in practice in everyday life (sometimes called ‘substantive equality’). (Te Kāhui Tika Tangata, Human Rights Commission, n.d.)

44. The principle as stated must contend with

· the existence of multiple local authorities with their own regulations and bylaws, so that different laws apply depending on where you live in Aotearoa;

· the difference between de jure and de facto equality before the law. For example freedom of speech is de facto quite different for wealthy owners of broadcasting, print or social media, who have their own power to spread their opinions and censor others, than for those who must use those outlets to have their voices heard; tax laws have quite different impacts on those who can pay experts to find ways to avoid them;

· it has always been understood that legislation sometimes needs to treat people differently for a variety of reasons such as to recognise existing rights (“savings” or “grandparenting”), or to reduce de facto disadvantage or inequality, or because they are not citizens of Aotearoa, or because they are Members of Parliament (regarding defamation).

45. That “there should be an independent, impartial judiciary” (s8(a)(iv)) is uncontroversial but is strange in a bill essentially about the development of regulations. It is part of the implementation of regulation and highlights the lack of consideration of other aspects of implementation of regulation such as enforcement and supporting structures.

46. S8(a)(v), states that “Issues of legal right and liability should be resolved by the application of law, rather than the exercise of administrative discretion.” For many people, accessing the law is expensive, time-consuming and stressful. Those with considerable resources are privileged in this. Cost, time and efficiency lead to the need for administrative methods of resolving such issues, with rights of appeal. This principle appears to cut off such options, to the advantage of those with money and expertise.

Liberties (s8(b))

47. This uses the undefined term “liberties” and focuses solely on individual rights. It does not balance the rights and needs of individuals with those of a larger collective, let alone consider the rights of collectives such as neighbourhoods, workers, customers, clients, families, whanau, hapū and iwi.

Taking of property (s8(c))

48. This provision is filled with dangers. The issue of regulatory “takings” of broadly defined or undefined “property” can lead to paralysis preventing needed change, huge costs to the government, and locking in of existing inequities, inequality, discrimination and poor environmental practice. Property has been interpreted to extend to not only real estate and material possessions but also contracts, licences, water rights, emission or pollution rights, or legitimate expectations of future income. There will be constant arguments that its interpretation should be extended into new areas. “Takings” can extend to reductions in the value of an item of property and can be “indirect” in the sense that they are reduced by regulation over a period of time or partially (“impairment”), rather than expropriated in a single event.

49. The theory of “regulatory takings” was developed by Richard Epstein, law professor at the University of Chicago, and it has been described in the US as “Rolling back the New Deal”. "It will be said that my position invalidates much of the 20th century legislation, and so it does," Epstein wrote. He told journalist and author William Greider, “Most of economic regulation is stupid.... What possible reason is there for regulating wages and hours? If my takings doctrine prevails, you have no minimum-wage laws. That's fine. You'd have an OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] a tenth of the size. That's fine too. You'd have no antidiscrimination laws for privileged employees, which would be a godsend." (Greider, 2001)

50. The principle of regulatory takings (“expropriation”) has been at the centre of the international controversies over cross-border investment agreements which provide standing for investors to sue governments in international tribunals (Investor-State Dispute Settlement or ISDS). There are many other concerns about these provisions. The agreements are either specialist investment promotion agreements or part of larger agreements such as the CPTPP. Awards in disputes have been in the millions or even billions of dollars and have covered mining, oil exploration and production, environmental protections, finance, taxation, timber and water rights, water supply, toxic products, electricity price controls, outcomes of privatisations and much else. The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement under the first Trump Administration excluded such provisions except in certain circumstances, and Aotearoa New Zealand governments have a policy against agreeing to them in international trade and investment treaties. Concerns have become so high that negotiators of these agreements often now insert interpretative notes or annexes in an attempt to reduce the scope for cases based on a claim of indirect expropriation and to attempt to protect the country’s right to regulate to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment (e.g. Annex 9-B of the Investment Chapter of the CPTPP)^[2]. It is too soon to tell whether they have been effective. No such protections are attempted in the bill.

51. How this principle would be interpreted in Aotearoa New Zealand law and practice is difficult to predict. But the intention is to make changes to the status quo distribution of property in all its forms expensive and difficult. When property includes rights to degrade the environment, environmental improvements become much more difficult. When it includes the value of a firm, regulation which increases pay and rights of its workers may be regarded as a taking. The international agreements are said to have created “regulatory chill” – reluctance by legislators to regulate in ways that have a risk of being interpreted as conflicting with the agreements, rather than regulating for the needs of their peoples. The intention of this bill is similar.

52. There is of course an element of this principle that is reasonable. Compensation when a property has to be taken to build a public road is a well accepted example. But the bald principle as stated would be disastrous to social, environmental and economic progress.

53. It is made even more pernicious by the provision that compensation should be provided, to the extent practicable, by or on behalf of the persons who benefit. Apart from the difficulties in fairly identifying the persons and apportioning the compensation they must pay, this may lead to disadvantaged people becoming doubly disadvantaged by having to pay compensation for measures taken to relieve them of that disadvantage.

54. Examples of how the provision might apply domestically include:

· Tobacco company Philip Morris has argued in WTO and investment agreement disputes against Australia and Uruguay that requiring plain packaging on their cigarettes was expropriation (a taking) and should be stopped or compensation paid. Tobacco companies were arguing similarly in Aotearoa New Zealand. For example Philip Morris’s Aotearoa New Zealand representative, Brett Taylor, wrote to then Associate Minister of Health Tariana Turia in July 2011 that plain packaging “involves the expropriation by the government of extremely valuable trademarks” (its intellectual property) and breached that Government’s own regulatory principles (Taylor, 2011, p. 5). Philip Morris failed in its international disputes, but not after delaying the introduction of plain packaging for several years, costing lives. The current plain packaging requirements could be argued to be in conflict with this principle, as could any future government action of a similar nature regarding other unhealthy products such as sugary or high-fat foods, vapes or alcohol.

· A soft drink company could challenge legislation to reduce the sales of sugary drinks to reduce obesity and improve dental health because it would reduce the value of the company, and demand full compensation if the legislation proceeds.

· In 2008, the government announced that owners of forests planted before 1990 would have to pay for the liability created under the Emissions Trading Scheme if they converted the land to other uses. The Flexible Land Use Alliance, consisting mainly of large corporates, claimed $3 billion to $4 billion of land value had been destroyed and said that if the Government did not back down it wanted full compensation (Eaton, 2008). The New Zealand Business Roundtable described it as expropriation (Kerr, 2008, p. 62).

· The Business Roundtable also described as expropriation the 2006 legislation that forced Telecom to separate its operations into retail, wholesale and network arms (“unbundling”) which was expected to provide significant savings to users. Then in 2010 Telecom warned that a government levy to expand rural broadband, a requirement for it to provide services to rural customers, and loss of $23m it received from other telecommunications companies as their share of the Telecommunications Service Obligations levy, would reduce its profits and share value, and argued that it was expropriation and illegal (Pullar-Strecker, 2010). Under this principle, Telecom would have been entitled to make a claim to stop the government reducing costs to users, increasing competition and accelerating the provision of rural broadband – or demand compensation.

· One of the actions considered to break up the supermarket duopoly of Countdown (Woolworths) and Foodstuffs was to force them to sell some of their stores to a new competitor. While breaking up dominant firms is not an unprecedented remedy in competition policy, Countdown described this as “extreme and unwarranted” and as expropriation (Pullar-Strecker, 2021, 2022). In the end both the Commerce Commission and government backed down. Under this principle, if a breakup had proceeded the supermarket owners would have been able to make a claim to stop the breakup, at a cost to consumers, or demand compensation from consumers for having their highly profitable duopoly position disrupted.

· Fishing quota is a property right. However its value is reduced if the government decides that the fish stock on which it is based has declined to an unsustainable level and takes action to reduce the allowable catch. Even under current law, there have been frequent legal challenges to such decisions, but this principle would open further channels for challenges to the law and its implementation, making management of Aotearoa New Zealand’s fisheries much more difficult.

· As Epstein stated, the minimum wage could be regarded as a taking. Minimum wage workers would be required to compensate their employer for an unknown amount if they were paid the minimum wage, making the minimum wage futile. The same would apply to other forms of regulated wage setting common in Australia (the Modern Award system) and Europe (such as administrative extension of collective bargaining agreements). No doubt some political parties and some employers would applaud this but as already discussed it would lead to low wages and impoverishment of already low paid workers.

· A tax is a taking. No exception is made for it. Those benefitting from a tax would have to compensate those who are taxed. With most taxes – such as income tax, company tax and GST – the beneficiaries are difficult or impossible to identify individually so the government would have to compensate the taxpayers, rendering taxation futile. Where beneficiaries are identifiable they must be made to compensate the tax payers. So presumably workers would have to compensate employers for paying the health and safety levy which enables WorkSafe to make workers safer, despite the recognition in law and good health and safety practice that the person who has control of the workplace (the employer or Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking) is the one who should have primary responsibility for its safety.

55. If the government really believes in this principle, it should compensate the women whose 33 pay equity claims were cancelled. Those claims were in pursuit of a right that they held under statute, with legitimate expectations of future additional income. The government would compensate them for the loss of that income.

56. Defenders of the bill will of course argue that some of these are outlandish interpretations. But they stem from Epstein, experience in international jurisdictions, and the logical interpretation of the words of the bill. What they emphasise is that this is an extraordinarily ill-considered – an outlandish – “principle”. It is not a general principle at all: it is a concept that is useful in a small set of circumstances such as public works but not in general. It has no place in defining regulatory quality and I, with many others, strenuously oppose it.

Taxes, fees and levies (s8(e)-(f))

Legislation should impose, or authorise the imposition of, a fee for goods or services only if the amount of the fee bears a proper relation to the costs of efficiently providing the good or service to which it relates.

57. This appears to rule out part-charges (such as lower bus fares for children on local authority bus services, part charges for public hospital services, or lower driver licencing fees for young people to encourage them to get a licence), and charges that are set to encourage or discourage certain behaviours (such as lower costs for disposing of green waste and higher costs for disposal of waste that cannot be recycled) because they either do not cover the costs of the service or exceed its cost. Workers who require registration to work in their chosen professions such as teachers or nurses would have to be charged full cost of the registration. The government (with good reason) arguably broke this principle when it announced in the 2025 Budget that it would pay teachers’ registration fees and levies. It might be argued that having no fee or levy is in keeping with this principle because the principle only applies only if a fee or levy exists, whereas a reduced fee (because it does not cover costs) breaks the principle. If so, the principle leads to absurd inconsistencies.

58. The “cost” is undefined. Is it only the immediate costs of say issuing a licence, or does it include wider costs such as to the environment or people’s productivity and health? A government might sensibly want to take account of broader objectives than the cost of a bus ride when deciding on the fare, and want to take wider costs into account – such as the greater congestion and carbon emissions if passengers went by car. The government took wider benefits into account when it decided to pay teachers’ registration fees and levies.

59. The purpose of this rule is to force governments to act like a business. That is a poor principle – indeed, like the previous one, it is not fit to be a general principle at all – and it is rejected by many people, including me. Instead it reflects the ideology of the sponsors of the bill and their view of how government should be run. The government is not a business – or even like a business – for a host of reasons, not least that it must govern in the interests of the whole country rather than for a group of shareholders, it cannot be wound up or go bankrupt (it has an indefinite life), and it must have the ability to tax and enforce its laws (exert coercion) in order to function.

Good lawmaking (s8(k), (l))

Legislation should be expected to produce benefits that exceed the costs of the legislation to the public or persons.

Legislation should be the most effective, efficient, and proportionate response to the issue concerned that is available.

60. That the Minister has been unable to quantify the full costs and benefits of this proposed legislation, nor demonstrate that it is the most effective, efficient and proportionate response available – and the evidence available is that it is consistent with neither of these principles – shows how difficult they are to implement.

61. As the RIS demonstrates, there are more effective, efficient and proportionate responses to the issue of regulatory quality than legislation, and in particular this legislation.

62. Once again, this bill conflicts with its own principles.

63. Costs and benefits must go well beyond financial or resource costs, because objectives may include health, safety, conservation, environmental protection and many others which are difficult to measure, or inherently values-based and unmeasurable, but it is not clear that these principles require that.

64. Cost-benefit analysis is therefore very difficult in many cases, particularly those expected to have long-term payoffs.

65. Aviation security provides an example of the difficulties in the real world. Several studies have shown that the passenger security measures that are ubiquitous in airports around the world cost much more than quantifiable benefits in terms of lives saved (Blalock et al., 2007; Stewart & Mueller, 2008, 2014). Yet extensive security measures continue, to the inconvenience of travellers. One explanation is that airlines have an interest in these measures being present in order to persuade passengers that they will be safe when flying so that they can continue to expand the industry. Whether or not this is a valid objective for such costs is difficult to evaluate but it is about more than quantifiable costs and benefits.

66. These principles will often be impractical to implement and their wording is unclear.

67. It is good to evaluate the costs and benefits of legislation but sometimes a government must take action without the benefit of the information needed for this purpose. This may be for reasons of genuine urgency (not the excessive use of urgency for improper reasons such as avoiding public scrutiny which many governments have been guilty of, this one included, such as the amendment of the pay equity legislation and many of its “first 100 days” actions). Or it may be because a step has to be taken to cut loose from an embedded status quo that has become injurious to the wellbeing of society.

68. Once again, it is difficult to accept this as a “principle” because of its difficulty of implementation and many exceptions. In a less dogmatic form it may be useful as guidance for consideration.

Minister and Attorney-General to issue best practice guidelines (s27)

69. As has been illustrated above, the principles will be difficult to interpret and are often poorly worded. There are great dangers and uncertainties in their interpretation. Their interpretation and practice will be highly political for these reasons and because of their nature. This section gives the Minister and the Attorney-General, both political appointees, the power to provide guidance on their practice, which must require them to interpret them at least to some degree. In effect this allows them to use the legislation for political purpose. It is a slight improvement on the previous proposal to give interpretative powers to the Minister alone, but it remains a highly dangerous step which I oppose.

Regulatory Standards Board (Subpart 7, ss28-40, and Schedule 2)

70. The proposed Regulatory Standards Board would be a further means to hear complaints about regulation. It duplicates some of the work of the Regulations Review Committee and the Ministry for Regulation in carrying out reviews. It adds to the regulatory burden on making and maintaining regulation. It has some unusual characteristics.

71. The members are proposed to be appointed by the Minister (s38) and the Minister may sack them “at any time and entirely at their discretion” (Schedule 2, cl2). This is similar to the arrangements for a Crown Agent which is the least independent form of Crown Entity in the Crown Entities Act 2004 (CEA: see s36) but it does not otherwise appear to be subject to the CEA. For example there is no expectation of diversity of membership of the Board, unlike CEA s29(2)(b), and if the CEA does not apply, members may be undischarged bankrupts, criminals or members of Parliament unlike CEA s30. Whole of government directions would not apply to it. It would not be subject to the Public Service Principles of the Public Service Act 2020 under its Subparts 2 and 4, like other Crown Agents (s10). Duties there include political neutrality. It is not clear how the Cabinet Manual and the Public Service Commission’s “Guide for Ministers: Statutory Crown Entities” would apply to it.

72. The Board is therefore entirely the instrument of the Minister who appoints members and may sack any who step out of line immediately and without any reason being given. This allows the Minister to make the Board a politicised extension of his will in an already politicised context.

73. Given that it can act to hold inquiries into legislation not only on the direction of the Minister for Regulation but also in response to a complaint or on its own accord, and given that the legislation (including secondary legislation) may be existing or proposed legislation (government bills), it will be in a position to have considerable influence in propagating the views that are inherent in the principles of this bill. By appointing people sympathetic to the ideology inherent in the principles, and feeding them legislation the Minister or allies, including corporates, lobby groups or individuals, want to change, the Board is in effect the starting point of an assembly line for creating pressure to rewrite any legislation the Minister or allies decide to campaign against. It provides a publicly funded basis for campaigning to change legislation the Minister dislikes.

The power of the Minister

74. The ability of the Minister with the Attorney-General to provide guidance and in doing so interpret the legislation, the power of the Minister and the Minister’s Ministry for Regulation to choose what regulatory reviews will be carried out and demand information from public service agencies, the power of the Minister to choose who sits on the Regulatory Standards Board and to dismiss them at will, the power of the Minister to choose legislation or bills the Minister wishes the Board to inquire into (or encourage allies to make complaints to the Board with the same effect), and the administration of this legislation through the Ministry for Regulation together give the Minister enormous power. The power is over matters that are often well outside the Minister’s portfolios and possibly competence, and which are inherently based on judgement and therefore inherently political. The Minister is accountable for this great power only to Cabinet colleagues – over whose current and proposed legislation he has a power of review – and caucus.

75. Who regulates the Minister?

Legislation Act 2019 Part 4

76. The RIS (paragraph 190, p.68) states that to bring the bill into effect, Part 4 of the Legislation Act 2019 would be required to be repealed. This is not stated in the bill nor its explanatory notes. Given that this has an important role in alternative approaches to regulatory quality (such as that favoured by the Ministry for Regulation), repealing it would destructively cut off those alternatives. The government’s position on this should be clarified.

Conclusion

This is an ideologically driven bill which, if successful in driving its misconceived principles into legislation and changing the interpretation of existing legislation by the courts, will have consequences that are unpredictable in their specifics but dangerous to social cohesion, social progress, and the environment. Its impact on economic performance is unpredictable but will be much less than claimed by the Minister, and outweighed by its negative effects, some of which – such as increasing social division, a degraded environment, and weakened capability of government – will damage the economy. It gives exceptional powers to the Minister. It is a heavy-handed and ineffectual way to address the real problems of regulatory quality.

The principles of the Regulatory Standards Bill would, for most of us, slow, stop or even reverse the social, environmental and economic progress that well-conceived and designed legislation can bring. They would lock us into an Aotearoa New Zealand that serves a relative few. In the end, regulation and legislation is there to improve our lives.

Recommendations

R3. This bill should not proceed.

R4. Consideration should instead be given to simplification of regulatory quality processes and their more effective implementation within the agencies responsible for regulation; ensuring the definition of quality covers the ability (including sufficient skills and resources) of relevant agencies to implement and enforce the regulation effectively; reducing the instances of duplication or overlap of these responsibilities; maintaining cross-party agreement; resourcing the agencies better for their regulatory quality responsibilities; and safeguarding the expertise residing in their staff.

Appendix: Regulation and Productivity

A1. The Minister in his foreword to the Ministry of Regulation discussion paper (p.3) makes the sweeping statement that “Most of New Zealand's problems can be traced to poor productivity, and poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations”. Similarly, since then he has regularly stated in media statements (e.g. 7 May 2025, 19 May 2025, 23 May 2025) “New Zealand's low wages can be blamed on low productivity, and low productivity can be blamed on poor regulation.” The relationship between regulation and productivity appears to be central to justifying the proposal’s heavy overheads and focus on cost and so is worth analysing.

A2. Notably, a quite different rationale was given in the Cabinet paper released with the Ministry consultation – the assertion made without evidence that “In [the Minister’s] view, government regulation imposes costs just as great, if not greater, on people’s everyday lives as government taxing and spending”. And in the Parliamentary debate for the bill’s first reading under urgency, the word “productivity” was mentioned only once, and in a different context (that “the cost of living crisis is really a productivity crisis”).

A3. To be clear: I am not asserting that good quality regulation is irrelevant to productivity. It certainly is relevant in many cases – often ones specific to a particular industry or project – and it is also necessary to ensure that the benefits of productivity growth are widely spread (such as into wages). But I am arguing that any assertion that our productivity problems can be solved by fixing our regulations is greatly exaggerated and does not justify the radical constraints on regulation-making in this proposal. As most experts would advise, there is no single solution to our productivity problems, and there is no instant fix – it is a long game.

A4. The first assertion, that “Most of New Zealand's problems can be traced to poor productivity” is clearly untrue if it is suggesting that most of Aotearoa New Zealand’s problems are economic ones. Think of climate change, demographic trends, geology and geographic isolation for example. Limiting the statement to economic problems, it is presumably channelling Paul Krugman’s often quoted “Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything” (Krugman, 1997, p. 11). But this was referring only to material living standards.

A5. Krugman has clarified this more recently (Krugman, 2023). He was discussing the possibility that improving workers’ health and safety from the “very dangerous places” they were in the US in the 1970s, and improved environmental regulations (that country’s Clean Air Act), slowed productivity increases in the US in the 1970s. The safety regulations were progress but not “progress that shows up in measures of real gross domestic product, and hence in productivity data,” he wrote. “So productivity numbers show only the costs, not the benefits, of safety regulations.” Similarly, he continued, the health and other benefits of much cleaner air (which systematic studies had found have much exceeded the costs) would not show up in measured productivity except possibly with a long lag.

So part of the productivity slowdown during the 1970s probably represented not so much a loss of dynamism as a shift in priorities — deliberate choices to make workplaces safer and skies cleaner, even at the expense of production.

Were these choices defensible? Definitely yes. Could the policies have been better applied? Of course – but when isn’t that true?

… it’s important to realize that making it easier for businesses to do what they want isn’t always a good thing.

And the broader lesson is that measured productivity isn’t the only thing that matters. What, after all, is the economy for? The goal is to improve people’s lives. This is often achieved by increasing gross domestic product per capita, but G.D.P. is an indicator, not an ultimate goal. We could have a bigger economy if we were willing to have filthy air and a lot more injured workers, but that’s not a trade-off we want to make.

A6. A second Ministerial assertion above is that “New Zealand's low wages can be blamed on low productivity”. All that can be said regarding the relationship between wages and productivity is that higher labour productivity enables higher (real) wages to be paid. But higher real wages do not follow automatically. That depends on other factors, notably bargaining power, such as through collective bargaining.

A7. Two notable economists recently reinforced the evidence that a connection between productivity growth and rising wages or living standards is not automatic. The 2024 Nobel memorial prize in economics winners, Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, find in their recent book on this subject, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity which gathers evidence from a broad range of historical and current knowledge,

There is nothing in the past 1,000 years of history to suggest the presence of an automatic mechanism that ensures gains for ordinary working people when technology improves. On the contrary, there are plenty of episodes in which technological breakthroughs were associated with no improvement – or even significant deterioration – in working conditions and living standards for most people.

Better technology offers the potential of better lives for many people, but only if it creates sufficient new tasks requiring human expertise and workers have enough power to demand a matching increase in compensation”.
(their emphasis. Acemoglu & Johnson, 2024, p. xii)

A8. The reference to “sufficient new tasks requiring human expertise” refers to their empirical and theoretical finding that some forms of technology may not raise living standards for many people and instead may concentrate wealth and power in a few hands.

A9.

I have documented that in New Zealand real wage increases have not kept up with labour productivity increases. The following figure shows that in the market sector of the economy (that is excluding public administration, education and health) between 1989 and 2023, if average wages and other employment costs had kept up with labour productivity growth they would have been 14% higher or $5.50 per hour or $9,500 per year for an average wage and salary worker. Dr Geoff Bertram and I have demonstrated that a large part of the reason for the weak wage growth shown here is the deregulation of labour relations through the Employment Contracts Act 1991, whose impacts have yet to be substantially reversed (Bertram & Rosenberg, 2024).

A10. The second part of the Minister’s statements is a rationale for the heavy apparatus he is proposing to set up: “poor productivity can be traced to poor regulations.” He presumably is suggesting that poor regulations are the sole or principal driver of poor productivity. Officials do not appear to be as convinced, referring to it as “important” in some places and “crucial” in others in the discussion paper and interim RIS for the Ministry consultation, and saying only that it “can” support innovation (which can be a means to raising productivity) among a long list of other possibilities in the latest RIS for the bill (p.13). But the Minister’s suggestion is not true. The following illustrates this.

A11. Consider the well-known “New Zealand productivity paradox” that first puzzled the OECD in 2003:

The mystery is why a country that seems close to best practice in most of the policies that are regarded as the key drivers of growth is nevertheless just an average performer. (OECD, 2004, p. 29)

A12. As OECD representatives explained at a symposium on the “paradox” in 2014 in Wellington,

past reforms of product and labour markets in New Zealand would suggest that the country is in a rather favourable position in terms of broad policy settings that are supportive to private investment, job creation, employment and productivity growth. (de Serres et al., 2014, p. 1)

A13. They were referring to “policies in different areas (taxation, product and labour market regulation, innovation and education)”. That is, regulation.

A14. So at the time, according to the OECD, Aotearoa New Zealand had an exemplary regulatory environment yet

looking at the decade of the 2000s, New Zealand has had one of the lowest growth rates in GDP per hour worked among OECD countries, despite trailing the OECD average at the start of the decade by around 15%, and the United States by nearly 40% (Figure 2). Closing 10% of the latter gap over the span of a decade would require annual productivity growth to exceed the US rate by at least half a percentage point on average. Instead, productivity growth has been on average almost one percentage point weaker. Considering that lagging countries have in principle greater scope for growing faster than most advanced economies, this performance is indeed puzzling. (de Serres et al., 2014, p. 1)

A15. Clearly the supposedly exemplary regulatory environment was not fixing the productivity problem. The causes lay elsewhere than in the quality of regulation.

A16. It is of course possible that what the OECD regarded as “best practice” was wrong or at least should have been treated as heavily country- and context-specific, rather than being fit for the purpose of broad inter-country comparisons. The latter is consistent with the views of Skilling (2020, p. 2) and the Productivity Commission (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2021, pp. 13, 24) that “small advanced economies are not just scaled-down versions of large economies but have distinctive characteristics in their economic behaviour” and that “New Zealand is not a ‘standard OECD country’ and faces an unusual set of challenges and opportunities”. That would be damaging to the case for the current proposal because it in part rests on the assertion that “New Zealand’s regulatory performance has also stagnated or worsened over time, according to results from recent international surveys”, citing the OECD (p.11 of the Ministry’s discussion paper).

A17. It should be noted that the OECD’s indicators reflect a particular view of good practice heavily oriented to market solutions, smaller government and weak employment regulation: positions which many countries are now revising (such as greater use of industry policy, which implies greater government participation, social and economic development objectives for government procurement rather than simply lowest cost, and backing out of privatisations (see for example Brooker, 2025)). The OECD itself has nuanced its view in favour of policies, including labour regulation, which aim for more inclusive economies and improved wellbeing, but which are not necessarily reflected in its regulation indicators.

A18. The OECD data provides evidence that the “quality” of regulation regarding productivity performance is indeed context-specific. The table below uses OECD, World Bank, and Transparency International data. For 2019 (pre-pandemic) or the most recently available before that, it shows labour productivity levels, average annual productivity increases over the previous 10 years, and rankings of those agencies’ views of regulatory quality. I compare Aotearoa New Zealand with the small advanced OECD countries in Skilling (2020).

A19. The standout from the comparison is that while Aotearoa New Zealand’s labour productivity level and productivity growth are low, those with much better productivity performance (most of the countries listed) mostly have lower or markedly lower rankings than Aotearoa New Zealand on most of the regulation indicators.

A20. It is inescapable from this evidence that regulatory quality issues are not overwhelming determinants of productivity performance. The context is all-important. Other aspects of a country’s policies, institutions, economic structure, trade performance, geography, history, culture, education, management skills, labour relations, demography, social cohesion and endowments (among other factors) are likely to be just as important, or more important.

A21. Of course arguments can be made about the details and definitions of these indicators.[3] But it is this evidence that is relied on to call for heavy-handed deregulatory measures. It is the only hard evidence mentioned in the discussion paper and interim RIS, and the evidence does not support the proposal. There is no other evidence presented (other than generalities and assertions) that Aotearoa New Zealand has remarkedly excessive or low quality regulation, either on an absolute basis or relative to other countries.

A22. Indeed the RIS (p. 13-14) makes some similar points to the above, notes that international measures do not consider levels of compliance and how well they work in practice, and observes that “New Zealand regulation rates reasonably well in international comparison” quoting evidence, and that “Ironically, more regulation in areas such as digital markets and political lobbying would much improve our Product Market Regulation ranking”.

A23. Instead an evidence-based approach to improving productivity involves diagnosing the real problems we face and designing solutions which address them. This may include regulations which are productivity-enhancing but would cause the OECD to downgrade the country’s ranking, and may well breach the proposed regulatory principles, such as –

· Kiwibank being given a public service obligation requiring it to compete strongly with the big four banks in exchange for government support to expand its services.

· Government procurement practices which encourage local industry development in areas of priority such as reducing carbon emissions or increasing skills, or assist firms develop markets and scale for new products, or assist the development of regional or Māori firms. Such measures are used internationally and have been suggested in the Productivity Commission report New Zealand firms: reaching for the frontier (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2021) and by the Digital Technologies industry in its Industry Transformation Plan (Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment, 2023). Variations of such measures appear to have support from both the current and previous governments.

· A more selective process for Foreign Direct Investment, as is being increasingly used internationally. The quality of Foreign Direct Investment in Aotearoa New Zealand has been low – it tends to be concentrated in non-tradeable sectors and in areas which provide market dominance, there are few spillovers in productivity or workers’ skills, or it perpetuates reliance on existing products such as log exports or lightly processed dairy products (Joyce, 2015, para. 23; Rosenberg, 2015). A “frontier firms” strategy to raise productivity, as recommended in the above Productivity Commission report, where development in a particular area is led by a large productivity-frontier firm, depends on selecting a few large firms with the required record and characteristics.

A24. Other forms of regulation can be productivity-enhancing. Competition rules can enforce more competitive markets or force dominant firms to purchase and supply at competitive rates. Environmental regulation can force producers to find more efficient production methods or to make their products work more efficiently. Labour regulation can incentivise producers to increase their use of capital and thus increase productivity.

---

[1] For example, in the three areas where Aotearoa New Zealand ranks lowest in the OECD’s view: low government R&D expenditure simply needs funding rather than regulatory change. A process for regulatory review in itself does not affect productivity – any impact will result from the regulations themselves. Many disagree that our FDI regulations, affecting mainly land, were as restrictive as the OECD implies.

[2] https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/TPP/Text-ENGLISH/9.-Investment-Chapter.pdf

[3] For example, in the three areas where Aotearoa New Zealand ranks lowest in the OECD’s view: low government R&D expenditure simply needs funding rather than regulatory change. A process for regulatory review in itself does not affect productivity – any impact will result from the regulations themselves. Many disagree that our FDI regulations, affecting mainly land, were as restrictive as the OECD implies.

References

Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2024). Power and Progress: Our thousand-year struggle over technology and prosperity. Basic Books.

Bertram, G., & Rosenberg, B. (2024). The Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the labour share of income in New Zealand: An analysis of labour market trends 1939-2023. New Zealand Economic Papers, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/00779954.2024.2330894

Blalock, G., Kadiyali, V., & Simon, D. H. (2007). The Impact of Post‐9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel. The Journal of Law & Economics, 50(4), 731–755. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.1086/519816

Brooker, M. (2025, January 4). UK burying Thatcher’s privatisation legacy. BusinessDesk/Bloomberg. https://businessdesk.co.nz/article/policy/uk-burying-thatchers-privatisation-legacy

de Serres, A., Yashiro, N., & Boulhol, H. (2014). An International perspective on the productivity paradox (Working Paper WP 2014/1). New Zealand Productivity Commission. https://www.productivity.govt.nz/publications/an-international-persepective-on-the-nz-productivity-paradox-6

Eaton, D. (2008, May 15). ‘Rich pricks’ bemoan treatment. Press, 4.

Greider, W. (2001, October 15). The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century. The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/article/right-and-us-trade-law-invalidating-20th-century

Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety. (2013). The report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: He korowai whakaruruhau. New Zealand Government. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/26238-the-report-of-the-independent-taskforce-on-workplace-health-and-safety-he-korowai-whakaruruhau

Joyce, S. (2015). New Zealand Investment Attraction Strategy [Cabinet Paper]. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/NZ-Investment-Attraction-Strategy-Cabinet-Paper.pdf

Kerr, R. (2008). Do Economists Agree on Anything? New Zealand Business Roundtable. http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/publications/Do%20Economists%20Agree%20on%20Anything.pdf

Krugman, P. (1997). The age of diminished expectations: U.S. economic policy in the 1990s (3rd ed.). MIT Press.

Krugman, P. (2023, February 7). Regulation, Productivity and the Meaning of Life. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/opinion/regulation-productivity-epa-osha.html

Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment. (2023). Digital Technologies Industry Transformation Plan. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/11638-digital-technologies-industry-transformation-plan

New Zealand Productivity Commission. (2021). New Zealand firms: Reaching for the frontier. https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/pc-inq-nzfrff-final-report-frontier-firms.pdf

OECD. (2004). OECD Economic Surveys—New Zealand Volume 2003 Supplement 3. Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2003/12/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2003_g1gh3d52/eco_surveys-nzl-2003-en.pdf

Pells, S. (2023). Which analytical tools are suited to transformative change? (Working Paper 23/01; CEU Working Papers). Chief Economist Unit, Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/economic-development/sustainable-and-resilient-economy-transformation/which-analytical-tools-are-suited-to-transformative-change

Pullar-Strecker, T. (2010, March 17). Broadband to cost Telecom. Dominion Post. https://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/it-telcos/3460972/

Pullar-Strecker, T. (2021, November 1). Supermarket critics smell blood as Commerce Commission probes separation options. Stuff.Co.Nz. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/126846104/supermarket-critics-smell-blood-as-commerce-commission-probes-separation-options

Pullar-Strecker, T. (2022, April 29). Tough talk on supermarket competition, but don’t get hopes up. Stuff.Co.Nz. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/opinion-analysis/128467642/tough-talk-on-supermarket-competition-but-dont-get-hopes-up

Rosenberg, B. (2015). Can We Ensure Foreign Investment Benefits New Zealand? New Zealand Business Law Quarterly, 21(4), 221–229.

Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy. (2012). Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Te Komihana a te Karauna mō te Parekura Ana Waro o te Awa o Pike.: Vol. Volume 1. Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy. http://pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz/Final-Report

Seymour, D. (2024). Speech To Wellington Chamber Of Commerce On The Principles Of Regulation [Speech]. New Zealand Government. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/print.html?path=PA2411/S00129/david-seymours-speech-to-wellington-chamber-of-commerce-on-the-principles-of-regulation.htm

Skilling, D. (2020). Frontier firms: An international small advanced economy perspective. Landfall Strategy Group. https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/pcrp/frontier-firms-international-small-advanced-economy-perspective

Stewart, M. G., & Mueller, J. (2008). A risk and cost-benefit assessment of United States aviation security measures. Journal of Transportation Security, 1(3), 143–159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-008-0013-0

Stewart, M. G., & Mueller, J. (2014). Cost-benefit analysis of airport security: Are airports too safe? Journal of Air Transport Management, 35, 19–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.11.003

Taylor, B. (2011, July 11). Plain Packaging of Cigarettes. https://extranet.who.int/fctcapps/sites/default/files/2023-11/Plain%20Packaging%20of%20Cigarettes_a.pdf

Te Kāhui Tika Tangata, Human Rights Commission. (n.d.). Right to Justice. Te Kāhui Tika Tangata | Human Rights Commission. Retrieved 7 January 2025, from https://tikatangata.org.nz/human-rights-in-aotearoa/right-to-justice